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Law, poLiTicS, aND The eroSioN oF LeGiTiMacY iN The DeLaware coUrTS
 One of the putative benefits of incorporation in Delaware is the expertise and 
knowledge of the Delaware courts. Professor Jonathan Macey says that Delaware 
“offers current and prospective charterers . . . a judiciary with particularized 
experience and expertise in corporate law.”1 Professor Faith Stevelman cites the 
“expertise” of Delaware’s judges as “fostering the state’s leading reputation in 
corporate law,” which “safeguard[s] the financial returns which f low to Delaware 
from its chartering business.”2 Professor Michael Klausner argues that Delaware’s 
dominance will likely be permanent in part because of the corporate expertise of 
Delaware’s judiciary.3 In fact, “[s]ome see the quality of the Delaware judiciary as the 
prime reason why corporations incorporate in Delaware.”4 The assertion of Delaware 
judicial superiority is so much a majority view that it in effect constitutes conventional 
wisdom within the corporate law academy.5
 Commentators have lauded not only the expertise of the Delaware judiciary but 
also its insulation from politics. Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have 
1. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a 
Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 Va. L. Rev. 265, 278 (1990).
2. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 
Del. J. Corp. L. 57, 130–31 (2009).
3. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757, 845–47 
(1995).
4. Kresimir Pirsl, Trends, Developments, and Mutual Influences Between United States Corporate Law(s) and 
European Community Company Law(s), 14 Colum. J. Eur. L. 277, 305 (2008) (“Delaware owes its 
corporate-law-environment superiority primarily to its specialized judiciary.”).
5. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate 
Law 213 (1991) (listing Delaware’s “large body of precedents” as one of the three main reasons for that 
state’s success in the market for corporate charters); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A 
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 542, 589–90 (1990) (emphasizing judicial expertise as 
a major factor for Delaware’s dominance in the state competition for corporate charters); Jens C. 
Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 477, 526 n.245 (2004) (“A 
number of scholars have noted that Delaware’s rich body of precedents is an important factor in 
attracting foreign corporations.”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1461, 1512 (1989) (“As the market has developed, Delaware has come to enjoy both a huge share 
of the market and a great amount of market power, because it offers attractions (some of which are 
beneficial to both shareholders and managers) that few other states can now match. Among these are a 
rich body of case-law that facilitates planning and dispute-settlement . . . .”); Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar 
Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1061, 1064 
(2000) (demonstrating that Delaware’s dominance in the corporate charter market is a result of the 
judiciary’s legislation-like law-making ability); Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware’s Vantagepoint: The Empire 
Strikes Back in the Post-Post-Enron Era, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 91, 97–101 (2008) (“Hence, the Delaware 
courts are the primary source of both the substance and enforcement of Delaware corporate law. By 
developing standards through a careful, contextual approach, rather than via broad pronouncements of 
unbending general rules, the courts assure further litigation over corporate legal norms and their 
application. The combination of upstream chartering activity and significant downstream corporate and 
business litigation supports a large incorporation and corporate law industry (composed of lawyers, 
registered agents, and others) in this otherwise tiny state . . . Delaware benefits from various ‘network 
advantages’—its widely known legal norms and practices provide familiarity and clarity which may add 
value and impose barriers to competition.”); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era 
of Corporate Reform, 29 J. Corp. L. 625, 638–39 (2004) (arguing that a factor for Delaware’s dominant 
position is Delaware’s extensive body of corporate law decisions). 
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compared Delaware courts favorably to federal courts: “Indeed, since Delaware’s 
judiciary is less politicized and has greater claims to expertise in corporate law than 
the federal judiciary, its rulings may enjoy greater legitimacy than would corporate 
rulings of federal judges.”6
 This essay offers a contrary perspective on this assertion of Delaware courts’ 
expertise. While they may or may not be experts, I believe that their corporate law 
jurisprudence, especially over the last decade, has drifted toward incoherence. This 
might be for any of several reasons. But whatever the cause, the Delaware courts are 
putting themselves at risk of descending into legal and political illegitimacy. This 
essay will seek to explain why.
 Part I of this essay will explain the importance of explanation in building and 
maintaining judicial legitimacy in the face of the so-called “counter-majoritarian 
difficulty” inherent in judicial decision-making.7 Part II offers examples of courts 
that sacrificed their own legitimacy because of incoherent, poorly reasoned judgments 
that strike readers as being based more on politics than law. Part III explains the 
implications of these insights for Delaware courts, namely that the Delaware judiciary 
needs to do a better job of justifying its decisions in traditional legal terms. Otherwise, 
the Delaware judiciary will increasingly be seen as merely instituting its political 
views by way of judicial rulings.
i. thE prObLEM Of COUrts and thE rEqUirEMEnt Of EXpLanatiOn
 Ever since John Marshall penned Marbury v. Madison for the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1803, a central problem of courts has been legitimacy. It was easy for 
Marshall to assert that: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”8 The more difficult task was to figure out a way 
to get the other branches of government and the general public to listen and obey.
 In Marbury itself, President Thomas Jefferson had made it known that he was 
not prepared to abide by any decision holding against him, and every law student in 
America has been taught the reason. After the bitter 1800 presidential election lost 
by incumbent John Adams, Adams tried to cement the power of his Federalists by 
appointing a number of his sympathizers to government positions before Jefferson’s 
inauguration. Marbury was one of these—Adams tried to appoint Marbury as Justice 
of the Peace (a fairly important position at the time) in the last days of the Adams 
administration.9 Marbury’s commission was never delivered, and once Jefferson came 
into office he instructed his Secretary of State, James Madison, to let it lie. Marbury 
6. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1573, 1612 (2005).
7. Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 
16–23 (2d ed. 1986).
8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
9. For a short summary of the lead-up to the case, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 1–2 
(3d ed. 2009). For a detailed account of the election of 1800, see John Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson: 
The Tumultuous Election of 1800 (2004). 
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then filed suit in the Supreme Court, asking for a writ of mandamus requiring 
Madison to deliver the commission. Marshall had himself been appointed Chief 
Justice in the last weeks of Adams’s term in office, and Marbury knew that the 
Supreme Court was the last remaining bastion of power for Adams’s Federalists.
 But Marshall was in a bind. He knew the Court had no army or police force to 
enforce its decision, and the influence of the Court was completely dependent on the 
legitimacy it could command from the other branches. On that score, Marshall had 
reason to worry. The Court’s influence was so weak that Congress, controlled by 
Jefferson’s party, passed a law abolishing the Court’s sittings until 1803 in order to 
delay the Court hearing the case.10 When the Marbury case finally made it to oral 
argument, President Jefferson refused to send a lawyer to argue his side.11
 Marshall’s response in the opinion for the Court was brilliant. The Court held 
that the Constitution did not allow the Court to have original jurisdiction over 
mandamus petitions, and the federal act that purported to give it such jurisdiction 
was therefore unconstitutional.12 In giving up its power to hear the case, the Court 
seized the power of judicial review, striking down a law passed by Congress and 
signed by the President. More importantly, Marshall crafted a way to consolidate the 
Court’s power that did not require either of the other branches to do anything. Only 
the Court itself was required to do something—decline to hear a case that could only 
make political difficulties for itself.
 When I teach Marbury to first-year law students, I ask them to focus on two 
insights from the case. First, the Court’s opinions and decisions come within a 
context in which the views of the other branches and of the general public matter a 
good deal. It has to be mindful of the political context in which it operates, because 
it cannot force other branches or the American public to do its will. If a court gets 
out of sync with the legal and political culture, its pronouncements risk being ignored 
or evaded. This awareness of the political context is an important component of a 
court’s legitimacy.
 Second, the Court’s legitimacy also depends on its distinctiveness from the 
political branches. This is perhaps in tension with the fact that courts need to be 
aware of the political context in which they operate, but a court’s power to “say what 
the law is” cannot be seen as a political act. Because of its insulation from political 
accountability and direct political check, the judiciary must be seen as doing law 
rather than politics. Politics is the realm of shear power, of will. If political actors, 
courts are unconstrained. Unconstrained, they will lose their claim to distinctiveness, 
weakening their assertion that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department” to have the last say on law.13
10. Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 2.
11. See Louis H. Pollak, Marbury v. Madison: What Did John Marshall Decide and Why?, 148 Proc. of Am. 
Phil. Soc’y 1, 6–8 (2004).
12. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 174–76.
13. Id. at 177; see The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), available at http://www.constitution.org/
fed/federa78.htm.
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 This is why scholars of judicial power have long fixated on the question of how 
to constrain courts in their exercise of power. Some scholars and judges argue that 
the best constraint is for courts to operate under a presumption of deference to the 
political branches.14 Others argue that judicial restraint should come by way of strict 
interpretive methodologies, either originalism (for constitutional questions) or strict 
textualism (for both statutory and constitutional issues).15
 There is merit in both suggestions, but in my view the most important judicial 
constraint is the requirement of explanation—the practice of courts to write out 
reasons for their judgments.16 Written opinions matter; explanations matter.17 The 
14. The leading statement of this proposition is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous dissent in Lochner 
v. New York: “[M]y agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody 
their opinions in law.” 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
15. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 10 (1971) 
(“[T]here is no way of deciding [constitutional questions] other than by reference to some system of 
moral or ethical values that has no objective or intrinsic validity of its own and about which men can and 
do differ . . . . [T]he judge has no basis other than his own values upon which to set aside the community 
judgment embodied in the statute.”); Dennis J. Goldford, The American Constitution and the 
Debate Over Originalism 174 (2005) (quoting Robert Bork as saying, “The truth is that the judge 
who looks outside the Constitution always looks inside himself and nowhere else”); Clarence Thomas, 
Justice, Sup. Ct., Wriston Lecture to the Manhattan Institute (Oct. 16, 2008), reprinted in Op-Ed, How 
to Read the Constitution, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 2008, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122445985683948619.html (“Let me put it this way; there are really only two ways to interpret the 
Constitution—try to discern as best we can what the framers intended or make it up. No matter how 
ingenious, imaginative or artfully put, unless interpretive methodologies are tied to the original intent 
of the framers, they have no more basis in the Constitution than the latest football scores. To be sure, 
even the most conscientious effort to adhere to the original intent of the framers of our Constitution is 
f lawed, as all methodologies and human institutions are, but at least originalism has the advantage of 
being legitimate and, I might add, impartial.”); see also Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 
Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 599, 602 (2004) (“By rooting judges in the firm ground of text, history, well-
accepted historical traditions, and the like, originalists hoped to discipline them.”). See generally 
Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate (Steven G. Calabresi ed. 2007); Antonin Scalia, A 
Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, The 
Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 59 (1988).
16. Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the Duty to Decide, 94 Geo. 
L.J. 121, 156 (2005) (“[T]he judiciary’s legitimacy and authority depend largely on its ability to 
persuasively explain and justify its decisions.”); Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 
987, 990–91 (2008) (“[Judicial] decisions are backed with the collective and coercive force of political 
society, the exercise of which requires justification. It must be defended in a way that those who are 
subject to it can, at least in principle, understand and accept. To determine whether a given justification 
satisfies this requirement, judges must make public the legal grounds for their decisions.”); David L. 
Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 731, 736–37 (1987) (“A requirement that 
judges give reasons for their decisions—grounds of decision that can be debated, attacked, and 
defended—serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power.”); Patricia M. Wald, 
The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1371, 1372 (1995) 
(“One of the few ways we have to justify our power to decide matters important to our fellow citizens is 
to explain why we decide as we do.”).
17. See Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the Ends of Expediency 
for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 235, 248 (1998) (“Written 
opinions encourage judges to produce well-reasoned, well-written decisions because they subject judges’ 
conclusions to public scrutiny. This leads to better, more consistent opinions because it holds judges 
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purpose of written opinions is “[a]bove all else to expose the court’s decision to public 
scrutiny, to nail it up on the wall for all to see. In no other way can it be known 
whether the law needs revision, whether the court is doing its job, whether a particular 
judge is competent.”18 If the reasons given by courts are not logical, clear, or persuasive, 
there will be push back from the bar, from democratic bodies, and from scholars.
 Explanation is a constraint for courts because it requires coherence, which usually 
means an explanation of why the result reached in a specific case f lows from neutral 
principles that the court will apply in other like cases.19 Not only does each explanation 
need to make sense, but a string of cases must fit together in a story. Advances and 
adjustments can be made over time, of course—that is the brilliance of the common 
law method.20 But one should be able to read a line of cases and construct a coherent 
narrative that holds together based on the court’s stated reasons and rationales, not 
just its results.21 In other words, explanation is a constraint because it means that the 
court has to remain linked to its decisions in past cases. Past cases need not be a 
straightjacket, but they should be anchors and baselines. If courts diverge from 
existing narratives, they need to explain why, and they need to do so in a way that is 
persuasive. Without such requirement of fealty to past decisions and rationales, courts 
erode into political institutions, because—as argued above—law requires constraint. 
If a court can reach whatever decision it wants, it is performing not as a legal actor 
but a political one.
accountable to the public which they serve. This accountability, in turn, dispels the perception of the 
judiciary as a self-regulating, secret society, and it legitimizes the judicial branch of the government in 
the eyes of its citizens.”).
18. Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, 237, 244 (2008) 
(quoting George Rose Smith, A Primer of Opinion Writing, For Four New Judges, 21 Ark. L. Rev. 197, 
200–01 (1967)).
19. Gerard N. Magliocca, The Philosopher’s Stone: Dualist Democracy and the Jury, 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 175, 
189 (1998) (“Courts are generally thought to derive legitimacy from acting according to what Herbert 
Wechsler called ‘neutral principles,’ by which he meant that rules of decision had to be applied with 
consistency to fact-patterns similar to the one that spawned the original rule.”); see also Barry Friedman, 
Neutral Principles: A Retrospective, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 503, 511–12 (1997); Kent R. Greenwalt, The 
Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 982, 985 (1978); Herbert Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1959). 
20. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 26 (1960) (“[T]he 
opinion has as one[,] if not its major[,] office to show how like cases are properly to be decided in the 
future . . . (If I cannot give a reason why I should be willing to stand to, I must shrink from the very 
result which otherwise seems good.) Thus the opinion serves as a steadying factor which aids 
reckonability.”). 
21. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 770 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (“Common law method 
tends to pay respect instead to detail, seeking to understand old principles afresh by new examples and 
new counterexamples. The ‘tradition is a living thing,’ albeit one that moves by moderate steps carefully 
taken. ‘The decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow closely on well 
accepted principles and criteria. The new decision must take its place in relation to what went before and 
further [cut] a channel for what is to come.’ (internal quotation marks omitted”)) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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ii. bad EXpLanatiOns and LEgitiMaCY
 When courts’ explanations are poor, when honest readers find genuine reasons 
submerged, and when doctrine becomes so malleable that a court can reach whatever 
result it desires, then judicial will has replaced law. In that situation, courts suffer 
blows to their legitimacy.22 History provides numerous examples of this very 
phenomenon.
 The so-called Lochner era is one example.23 In the four decades before 1937, the 
Supreme Court was so committed to a jurisprudence of laissez-faire that it used 
virtually every tool at its disposal to fight the ability of state and federal governments 
to regulate the economy.24 If the regulation came from the federal government, the 
Court cited a narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause power or a broad 
interpretation of the non-delegation doctrine to strike down regulatory efforts.25 If 
efforts to regulate the economy came from states, the Court’s language switched to a 
focus on “freedom” and economic “liberty” that was protected by substantive due 
process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 The reasoning of the Court 
became increasingly incoherent, unworkable, and transparently political. For instance, 
after insisting in numerous cases that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power 
(only) to regulate the passage of goods across borders (including in Champion v. 
Ames, where the Court upheld federal power to prohibit interstate shipments of 
lottery tickets),27 the Court ruled in Hammer v. Dagenhart that Congress could not 
prohibit the passage of goods manufactured by child labor across borders.28 The best 
explanation for the difference was that the Court did not want the regulation of 
commerce to be a mechanism through which the federal government could implement 
progressive visions of workers’ rights.
 The Court’s anti-regulatory bias became a significant obstacle to effective 
legislative and regulatory responses to the Great Depression, and the Court was 
22. See Patrick Emery Longan, Professionalism on the Appellate Bench: The Life and Example of Justice George 
Rose Smith of the Arkansas Supreme Court, 54 Ark. L. Rev. 523, 550 (2001) (“Another purpose of the 
appellate opinion is institutional legitimacy . . . . The court and the author expose themselves to scrutiny 
and the possibility of criticism, or even condemnation, if the opinion is not well written or reasoned. 
Legitimacy follows from publication if the author of the opinion can demonstrate competence and 
diligence in resolving the case.”); George Rose Smith, A Primer of Opinion Writing, For Four New Judges, 
21 Ark. L. Rev. 197, 200–01 (1968) (explaining that the purpose of an appellate opinion is “above all 
else to expose the court’s decision to public scrutiny, to nail it up on the wall for all to see”). See generally 
Daniel John Meador & Jordana Simone Bernstein, Appellate Courts in the United States 
(1994).
23. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 166 
(1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that Lochner represents the “nadir” of judicial competence).
24. See Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 145. 
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
28. 247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918).
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increasingly the target of harsh political criticism.29 Eventually, in early 1937 President 
Franklin Roosevelt proposed his controversial “court packing” plan that would have 
given him the opportunity to appoint several new Justices to the Court.30 That plan 
was seen as too political, but it was not long until the Court changed its tune. Within 
a few weeks, the Court held in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish31 that economic “liberty” 
would no longer serve as the basis for limiting state regulatory efforts, upholding a 
minimum wage law that was “almost identical to the one [that had been] struck 
down the previous year.”32 Soon afterward, the Court also ruled that the Commerce 
Clause allowed the federal government broader Commerce Clause power than it had 
previously recognized.33 This was the famous “switch in time that saved nine.”34 The 
Court’s doctrinal distinctions were becoming increasingly incoherent, which meant 
it was increasingly seen as a political institution. This opened the door to allowing it 
to be changed by way of political pressure.
 In the Lochner era, incoherence meant a fixation on result and an inability to 
articulate a neutral principle that the Court respected consistently. Incoherence can 
also spring from vagueness, since a vague rule contains a less genuine constraint on 
judicial will. One of the more modern examples of Supreme Court incoherence 
comes from the so-called liberal side of the modern Court in the privacy cases. Ever 
since Justice William O. Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut articulated a right to 
contraceptive services that sprang from “penumbras, formed by emanations” from 
explicitly articulated constitutional rights,35 the important rights based on such 
reasoning—the right to medical care,36 the right to terminate unwanted pregnancy,37 
the right to engage in consensual sexual relations with someone of the same sex38—
have been on tenuous political and legal ground. These holdings have been based on 
“substantive due process,” an awkward linguistic phrasing that hints at a broader 
doctrinal difficulty (e.g., how is process substantive?).39
29. See Drew Pearson & Robert Allen, The Nine Old Men (1936).
30. Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Court Packing Plan, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, http://judiciary.
senate.gov/about/history/CourtPacking.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
31. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
32. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States 204 (Kermit L. Hall et al. 
eds., 1992) [hereinafter The Oxford Companion].
33. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30–32, 37–38 (1937).
34. See The Oxford Companion, supra note 32, at 204.
35. 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965).
36. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (right to refuse treatment); Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (physician-assisted suicide).
37. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
38. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
39. See Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 Va. L. Rev. 951, 969 (2002) (“In light of the 
oxymoronic character of the doctrine of substantive due process, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause is a very awkward vehicle for incorporating substantive rights like freedom of speech or 
religion.”); Stephen Kanter, The Griswold Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Rights, 28 
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 The phraseology used by the Court in explaining its decisions often exacerbates 
the incoherence. In Lawrence v. Texas, for example, the Court struck down Texas’s 
sodomy statute saying that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they 
formed under compulsion of the State.”40 This kind of language is not easily 
constrained. As Justice Scalia said in dissent in Lawrence, such reasoning does not 
easily distinguish anti-sodomy statutes from laws prohibiting “bigamy, . . . adult 
incest, prostitution,”41 or “recreational use of heroin.”42
 It is possible to construct a coherent theory of substantive due process (or, for that 
matter, equal protection or privileges and immunities) that protects the right to 
terminate a pregnancy, have access to contraceptives and medical care, or have 
intercourse with someone of the same sex, and which distinguishes those rights from, 
for example, the “right” to use heroin. (I would point to the concurrence of Justice 
David Souter in Washington v. Glucksberg43 or Justice John Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. 
Ullman44 as examples of how good judges go about the task with integrity. Here’s a 
Cardozo L. Rev. 623, 692 (2006) (“To begin, the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not suffer any 
of the textual awkwardness of substantive due process.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of 
Constitutional Property, 86 Va. L. Rev. 885, 894, 982 (2000) (“As a constitutional doctrine, substantive 
due process is a mile wide and an inch deep . . . . By far the most difficult definitional issue is presented 
by substantive due process.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone?, 53 Hastings 
L.J. 987, 991, 1004 (2002) (“It also makes sense to say that substantive due process should be used 
sparingly, because of its uncertain textual basis and because of the unreliability of judicial judgments 
about which rights should qualify as fundamental . . . . The argument for a cautious approach to the due 
process clause depends in part on a belief that the idea of ‘substantive due process’ is awkward as a 
matter of text and history.”). Some scholars believe that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is a better basis for substantive, fundamental rights. See Stephen Kanter, The 
Griswold Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Rights, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 623, 694 
(2006) (“Stripped of error, however, Justice Miller’s discussion [in the Slaughter-House Cases opinion] of 
the words privileges and immunities offers the beginning of meaningful content for them as words 
which can now be used in a Fourteenth Amendment Meta Principle.”); see also Scott Dodson, Vectoral 
Federalism, 20 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 393, 457 (2003) (“[T]he Privileges or Immunities Clause is 
experiencing academic revival . . . .”); David H. Gans, The Unitary Fourteenth Amendment, 56 Emory 
L.J. 907, 927–28 (2007) (proposing a “unitary reading of Section 1” of the Fourteenth Amendment that 
would “reinvigorate the Privileges or Immunities Clause” and make it the “basis” for the protection of 
fundamental rights); Risa E. Kaufman, Access to the Courts as a Privilege or Immunity of National 
Citizenship, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1477, 1477 (2008) (“[T]he right to court access for civil litigants, 
particularly the right to access the federal courts, is a privilege or immunity of national citizenship 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Clark M. Neily III & Robert J. McNamara, Getting Beyond 
Guns: Context for the Coming Debate over Privileges or Immunities, 14 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 15 (2009) 
(arguing for the reinvigoration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
40. 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (plurality opinion)).
41. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 592 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43. See 521 U.S. 702, 767–69 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
44. See 367 U.S. 497, 542–43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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hint: neither has anything to say about the “meaning of the universe.”) But the Court 
has not done such a good job of it.
 The problem of legitimacy is not just an issue for federal courts, of course. One 
example of incoherence from state courts comes from the 1980s and 1990s, when 
many state courts struggled with the definition of rape. Many courts still imposed 
the requirement that, to prove rape, the prosecution had to show the use of force to 
overcome the victim’s will. Lack of consent, in itself, was not enough.45 The tension 
between the two conceptions of rape—forced intercourse as opposed to intercourse 
without consent—came to the fore in one particular case in Pennsylvania. In 
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz,46 the defendant was a male college student who had 
intercourse with a female student who vocally protested throughout the encounter 
but who did not physically fight back. A jury convicted the man of rape, but the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned the conviction. The key passage was: “As to 
the complainant’s testimony that she stated ‘no’ throughout the encounter with 
[Berkowitz], we point out that, while an allegation of fact would be relevant to the 
issue of consent, it is not relevant to the issue of force.”47
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s result was the source of wide controversy.48 
Women’s groups protested; court watchers issued scathing critiques, saying the 
opinion was “one of the worst setbacks for the sexual assault movement in the last 
several years.”49 One newspaper halfway across the country asked in an editorial, 
“What is it about the word ‘no’ they”—the “seven men sitting on the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court”—“don’t understand?”50 “Obviously the court has a difficult time 
comprehending the most unambiguous word in the English language.”51
 The court’s holding was seen as incoherent, but not in the same way that the 
Lochner era cases or the substantive due process cases reveal incoherence. In the 
45. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984) (overturning a lower court decision finding 
second-degree rape when a woman was forced to have sex out of fear on the grounds that there was no 
force); State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990) (holding that no rape occurred because the 
statute required there to be force when a high school principal threatened student that he would withhold 
her diploma if she did not have sex with him); Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988) 
(overturning a guardian’s conviction for rape because of lack of showing of force when an adult guardian 
of a teenage girl threatened to have her recommitted to a juvenile detention facility if she did not submit 
to his sexual advances).
46. 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), aff ’d in part and vacated in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
47. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164.
48. For a fascinating use of the Berkowitz case to show the effect of cultural bias on the fact-finding of 
juries, see Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in “Acquaintance 
Rape” Cases (Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law Sch., U. Penn. Law Sch. Working Paper No. 29, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1437742.
49. Dale Russakoff, Where Women Can’t Just Say “No”; Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules Force is Needed to 
Prove Rape, Wash. Post, June 3, 1994, at A1 (quoting Cassandra Thomas, president of the National 
Coalition Against Sexual Assault).
50. Editorial, When “No” Means Nothing, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 6, 1994, at 6B (quoting Deborah 
Zubow of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom).
51. Id.
491
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 55 | 2010/11
Lochner era cases, courts fixated on result at the expense of consistency; in the 
substantive due process privacy cases, courts are guilty of articulating vague standards 
that do not provide guidance or limits.
 In contrast, the incoherence in Berkowitz is a problem of obtuseness. What I 
mean by this is that the opinion seems disconnected to the experiences of many 
people (especially women) who read it. An opinion setting aside a jury conviction for 
rape in a case in which the victim verbally protested throughout the encounter, on 
the ground that no force was involved, could reasonably strike a reader as a victory of 
form over substance. Such an opinion also ignores the genuine experience of many 
women who are so fearful in such assaults that they believe any resistance would be 
met by even worse consequences. Such an opinion ignores the fact that the most 
powerful force is one that need not be exercised. It also fails to come to terms with 
the fact that the harm that comes from rape arises not just because of force involved, 
but because of the lack of consent on the part of the victim.
 Obtuseness—when courts “ just don’t get it”—is a kind of incoherence because it 
means that the court’s explanation is not ultimately persuasive to the readers of the 
opinion. And when readers of a judicial explanation believe the court is missing an 
insight that is fundamental to understanding the case, the court risks losing its place 
as a respected arbiter of disputes.
 These various kinds of incoherence—result orientation, vagueness, and 
obtuseness—are, of course, related. If a court is fixated on result, it is likely to 
articulate vague rules. If it is missing key insights, it is free to reach results that fit 
with its pre-existing assumptions. If a court articulates its holding in vague ways that 
do not constrain its judgment in future cases, it is more able to reach pre-determined 
results and more likely to elide key aspects of a persuasive judgment. In any event, 
the key point is that a court’s failure, over time, to articulate persuasive and consistent 
rationales for its judgments will result in harm to the court’s reputation. This 
reputational harm will result in a loss of legitimacy and respect for the court’s 
judgments.
iii. dELaWarE COUrts and inCOhErEnCE
 For many years, one of the putative bases for Delaware’s dominance in the 
competition among states to provide corporate charters is the expertise of the Delaware 
judiciary in deciding corporate law cases.52 The notion of Delaware judicial expertise 
has become conventional wisdom in the academy as well as in corporate practice. But it 
is becoming increasingly difficult to make that claim if one wants to base it on the 
actual performance of Delaware courts in producing coherent legal doctrine.
 My perspective on this question is informed (or skewed, perhaps) by the fact that 
I teach the basic corporate law course to one hundred or more law students each year. 
They are eager to discuss and explore the underlying themes and narratives of this 
fascinating area of law, but they are also eager to learn the black-letter doctrine. In 
the latter pursuit, I am increasingly unable to make sense of existing Delaware 
52. See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text.
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corporate law. I must admit to my students that I do not know how best to characterize 
much of the corporate law doctrine of the jurisdiction.
 Allow me to take an example that occurs early in the course: the duty of care. 
The key modern case, In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,53 
articulates a fundamental duty on the part of corporate fiduciaries to stay informed 
and to obey the law. But the actual results of the case—in which the directors escaped 
liability even though unlawful activity had cost the firm $250 million in fines—
strikes students as inconsistent with the rhetoric of the case.54 When I point the 
students to the language in the opinion where the court establishes that the board 
can avoid liability merely by establishing an information system that will give them 
fair warning of financial or legal improprieties, and that the extent of such a 
monitoring system is subject to the deferential business judgment rule,55 students 
rightly question the integrity of the court’s insistence on the underlying duty at all. 
So I am left opining that the court continues to assert the existence of a duty of care 
but does not seek to have it enforced in a meaningful way.56 The students are left 
wondering if there is a genuine duty of care anymore.
 It does not get much better when we turn to the duty of loyalty. For example, 
what is the effect of ratification of a self-interested transaction—is it dispositive, as 
the statute seems to imply? If not, what is the standard the plaintiff has to meet? Is it 
lack of fairness, as some cases imply?57 Or is it the more managerially protective 
business judgment rule, as other cases seem to hold?58 This strikes me as a fairly 
important doctrinal point, but the Delaware judiciary has done worse than leave it 
undecided. It has decided it in contradictory ways.
 When we study the duties of directors in takeover situations, the law—again—
seems to lack a certain clarity. Do Revlon duties require directors to fixate on 
shareholder gain, as Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. and its progeny 
seemed to say?59 Or do fiduciary duties in such a situation give directors more 
53. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
54. See id. at 971–72. 
55. Id. at 968–70.
56. See Edward R. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 
1009 (1997) (discussing the difference between the rhetoric of corporate law cases and their actual 
holdings).
57. Cf. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428–29 (Del. 1997) (stating that the standard of review for 
an independent committee of the board negotiating a transaction in which there is an interested 
controlling shareholder is “entire fairness”).
58. See Cooke v. Oolie, No. 11134, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 89, at *44 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000) (fairness); 
Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 (Del. 1987) (“[A]pproval by fully-informed disinterested 
directors under section 144(a)(1), or disinterested stockholders under section 144(b)(2) permits invocation 
of the business judgment rule and limits judicial review to issues of gift or waste with the burden of 
proof on the party attacking the transaction.”). 
59. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Paramount 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1994).
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discretion, as Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., seemed to say?60 And the 
2009 case, Lyondell Chemical Company v. Ryan, confused my students even more. 
Whatever the Revlon test was, did the Delaware court change it in Lyondell, 
essentially adding an intent test for director liability?61
 Admittedly, our confusion about Lyondell is really a confusion over the doctrine of 
good faith, which has been fodder for law school classroom (and law professors’ 
conference) discussions for a decade or more. For all of that discussion in classrooms, 
conferences, and Delaware opinions, one still labors to understand the test for good 
faith. Is it an “utter failure” to meet one’s duties (as the Delaware court endorsed in 
Lyondell)62 or the analytically distinct “reckless disregard” of one’s duties (that the 
Delaware court articulated in, ahem, Lyondell).63 The distinction is not lost even on 
beginning legal scholars: one test asks about behavior, the other about mental state. Or, 
does a plaintiff have to prove both a knowing failure and a complete failure? This, too, 
was asserted in Lyondell.64 Finally, now that after almost a decade of indecision65 the 
Delaware courts have decided that the duty of good faith is a component of the duty of 
loyalty rather than a stand-alone duty,66 does it make any sense for the doctrine to 
depend on a test (“utter failure”) derived from Caremark, a duty of care case?67
 I have ceased being embarrassed by my inability to articulate a coherent set of 
tests for corporate law duties under Delaware law, as it has become clear that I am 
hardly alone in my inability. Indeed, “[c]ommentators are in wide agreement that 
60. See Paramount Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1153.
61. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243–44 (Del. 2009).
62. The “utter failure” language, originated in Caremark, was followed in Stone v. Ritter, and endorsed in 
Lyondell. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006) (“[O]nly a sustained or systematic failure of 
the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information 
and reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to 
liability.”) (quoting In re Caremark Int’l. Inc Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)); 
Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 240, 244. (“The trial court approached the record from the wrong perspective. 
Instead of questioning whether disinterested, independent directors did everything that they (arguably) 
should have done to obtain the best sale price, the inquiry should have been whether those directors 
utterly failed to attempt to obtain the best sale price.”) (citing Stone and In re Caremark) (emphasis added).
63. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 243 (“[B]ad faith will be found if a ‘fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face 
of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.’”).
64. Id. at 243–44 (“Only if they knowingly and completely failed to undertake their responsibilities would 
they breach their duty of loyalty.”) (emphasis added).
65. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, n.112 (Del. 2006) (“For the same reason, we 
do not reach or otherwise address the issue of whether the fiduciary duty to act in good faith is a duty 
that, like the duties of care and loyalty, can serve as an independent basis for imposing liability upon 
corporate officers and directors. That issue is not before us on this appeal.”).
66. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70 (“The failure to act in good faith may result in liability because the 
requirement to act in good faith is a subsidiary element, i.e., a condition, of the fundamental duty of 
loyalty.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
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Delaware corporate law lacks clarity.”68 During the conference for which this essay 
was written, some of the leading corporate law scholars in the country expressed 
similar frustration.69 James Cox, in describing the “entire fairness” standard, admitted 
that he was “not sure what that means.”70 He described the Delaware court’s causation 
standard in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.71 as “non-sensical” and called Delaware 
jurisprudence “screwy.”72 Alan Palmiter said that, in the context of the various cases 
on the duty of good faith, Delaware was either saying “everything” or “nothing” and, 
in the context of the duties of care and loyalty, had “screwed it up.”73 Mae Kuykendall 
admitted that she was “uncertain” whether good faith had any real substance.74 
Kristin Johnson offered a hypothesis of Delaware law based on “an absence of a 
functional framework.”75
 Other scholars see similar difficulties. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez, and 
Benjamin Oklan recently opined that “new and unnecessary doctrinal uncertainties 
have been created” by Delaware’s good faith jurisprudence.76 Clark W. Furlow said 
that “Delaware’s inability to offer a clear, consistent conception of good faith is 
significant.”77 Robert B. Ahdieh asserted that Delaware maintains “a certain lack of 
clarity in its legal rules.”78
68. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1205, 1233 n.120 (2001).
69. Symposium, The Delaware Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith after Disney: Meaning ful or Mickey Mouse?, 
(Nov. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Good Faith after Disney Symposium]. An archive of the symposium is 
available at http://nyls.mediasite.com/mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=98c600182aeb4f0
98abd525b2c5b5c89.
70. James D. Cox, Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Good Faith after Disney 
Symposium, supra note 69.
71. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del 1993).
72. Cox, supra note 70.
73. Alan R. Palmiter, Professor of Law at Wake Forest Univ. Sch. of Law, Good Faith after Disney 
Symposium, supra note 69.
74. Mae Kuykendall, Professor of Law at Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Good Faith after Disney 
Symposium, supra note 69.
75. Kristin N. Johnson, Professor of Law at Seton Hall Univ. Sch. of Law, Good Faith after Disney 
Symposium, supra note 69.
76. Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 559 
(2008).
77. Clark W. Furlow, Good Faith, Fiduciary Duties, and the Business Judgment Rule in Delaware, 2009 Utah 
L. Rev. 1061, 1062 (2009).
78. Robert B. Ahdieh, Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for Corporate Governance, 
77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 255 n.131 (2009); see, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) 
(adopting a non-literal interpretation of Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2001)); see also Speiser v. 
Baker, 525 A.2d 1001 (Del. Ch. 1987) (adopting a non-literal interpretation of Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, 
§ 160(c) (2001)); Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon, 196 B.R. 348, 355 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (“In Delaware 
[the leading jurisdiction], ‘the extent to which directors of putatively insolvent corporations [can] 
continue to advance the interests of stockholders without violating their fiduciary duty to the corporate 
entity or to creditors remain[s] hazy.’”) (quoting Matthew Bender & Co., Delaware Corporation Law & 
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 These are not casual observers. These scholars are experts in the field who study 
Delaware jurisprudence deeply and consistently. But they do not see coherence. Even 
the Delaware Chancery Court has admitted that corporate law doctrine in Delaware 
is “shrouded in a fog of hazy jurisprudence.”79
  The kind of incoherence at center stage in Delaware is of the vagueness stripe, 
but the problems of result orientation and obtuseness are inherent as well. The 
Delaware courts are widely seen as fiercely protective of management,80 a result 
orientation that is easy to satisfy given their vague rules. The Delaware courts also 
often seem obtuse and out of touch. For example in Disney, the result protecting 
managerial prerogative even when it resulted in a severance payment of $130 million 
for a failed executive could reasonably strike an observer as a victory of form over 
substance.81 The court’s inability to see the squandering of such wealth as a violation 
of the obligation of care, loyalty, or good faith, seemed out of touch with what most 
people would think those words mean, with what most people would think the 
obligations of executives should be, and with what most people would think of the 
value of that amount of money.
 My point is that if legitimacy springs from persuasive explanation, the Delaware 
courts are putting themselves at risk. More problematically, if law is a constraint, 
Delaware courts are increasingly likely to be seen as political rather than legal actors 
since their reasoning does not constrain them from reaching the outcomes they prefer 
in any given case.82 After a while, what the Delaware courts are doing will cease to 
Practice § 15.15, at 15-106 (1994)); Jon Dwain McLaughlin, The Uncertain Timing of Directors’ Shifting 
Fiduciary Duties in the Zone of Insolvency: Using Altman’s Z-Score to Synchronize the Watches of Courts, 
Directors, Creditors, and Shareholders, 31 Hamline L. Rev. 145, 155 (2008) (“The case law is such that 
commentators and courts alike have not been able to pull from the opinions any generally applicable 
clear-cut principles or rules concerning the fiduciary duties of directors towards creditors.”); Philip S. 
Garon, et al., Challenging Delaware’s Desirability as a Haven for Incorporation, 32 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 769, 773 (2006) (“Minnesota’s statutory codification creates more certainty than the Delaware case 
law because of (a) internal ambiguities in many of the Delaware judicial decisions; (b) apparent 
inconsistencies among certain contemporaneously decided Delaware cases; (c) divergence of certain 
decisions with the letter of, and apparent policy behind, the Delaware statute; and (d) tendency of the 
Delaware courts to reverse or ignore precedent and upset expectations.”); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, 
Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1205 n.120 (“However, even 
where the code contains relatively precise language, Delaware courts do not necessarily follow the code 
when they find the results objectionable.”).
79. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63 n.98 (Del. 2006); see Solomon v. Armstrong, 
747 A.2d 1098, 1113–14 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“Delaware’s law concerning the effect of shareholder 
ratification in the face of an alleged breach is not a model of clarity.”).
80. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 666 
(1974) (Delaware law allows for “the race for the bottom” in favor of management at cost to 
shareholders).
81. Disney, 906 A.2d at 27.
82. In her comments at this conference, Justice Carolyn Berger, the author of Lyondell, admitted as much. 
In an answer to a question about the implications of the managerially protective language in Lyondell 
that managers would be held liable for a breach of the duty of good faith only if they “utterly” fail to 
meet their obligations, Justice Berger said that such language would not stop the Delaware courts from 
finding liability in a case in which they were convinced they needed to find liability. See Hon. Carolyn 
496
Law, poLiTicS, aND The eroSioN oF LeGiTiMacY iN The DeLaware coUrTS
be seen as law and will instead be seen as simply judicial will. This, too, will cost 
them legitimacy.
 What will be the implications for Delaware, and the Delaware judiciary? We 
might see more federal intervention into the fabric of corporate governance, something 
we have already had a hint of in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.83 Other states could 
begin asserting their right to govern the internal affairs of corporations based outside 
of Delaware, notwithstanding the corporations’ Delaware charters.84 The 
persuasiveness of the notion that Delaware has won a “race to the top” in corporate 
law will wane, along with the notion that there is something special about the expertise 
of Delaware courts when it comes to matters of business and corporate governance. 
Scholars will increasingly chide the court for lack of clarity and coherence. Students 
of corporate law will finally realize that the emperor has no clothes.
Berger, Good Faith after Disney: Justice Berger’s Closing Discussion, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 659, 661–62 
(2010–11).
83. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 
U. Rich. L. Rev. 317, 374–75 (2004) (“Sarbanes-Oxley represents another instance of federal intrusion 
seeking to compensate for lax standards at the state level. Sarbanes-Oxley forces the board to be more 
informed, largely supplanting Delaware law concerning the duty to monitor. Counsel must report to 
management suspected breaches of fiduciary duties. Companies are required to put in place information 
gathering systems—a requirement that has effectively overturned Delaware law. Sarbanes-Oxley 
increases both the standards for, and the duties of, directors on the audit committee.”) (footnote 
omitted); Renee M. Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 
41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 879 (2006); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of 
Corporate Reform, 29 J. Corp. L. 625 (2004); Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate 
Lawmakers, 34 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 12–15 (2009) (discussing how aware the Delaware judiciary is of the 
potential power of the federal government in the area of corporate law); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 
118 Harv. L. Rev. 2491, 2521–22 (2005) (“[Sarbanes-Oxley] illustrates a Congress swept by scandal 
and national opinion into regulating corporate organization in a way it usually leaves to state law. 
Delaware authorities did seek the chance to remedy the corporate governance debilities that the scandals 
highlighted, but the state didn’t act dramatically, perhaps because the concerned officials were judges, 
who need a case before them to act, or because Delaware’s primary interest groups wouldn’t have been 
able to agree on what to do in the legislature.”). 
84. See Kent Greenfield, Democracy and Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 67 J.L. & Contemp. 
Probs. 135 (2004). 
